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to	 encourage	 them	 to	 compete	 on	 quality	 but	 prices	 are	 set	 in	 different	 ways	 across	
countries.	 They	 can	 be	 collectively	 negotiated,	 determined	 by	 the	 political	 process,	
negotiated	 between	 insurers	 and	 providers	 or	 centrally	 determined	 by	 provider	 costs.	
Competition	amongst	GPs	varies	across	countries	and	is	limited	in	some	cases	by	shortages	
of	providers	or	restrictions	on	entry.	There	are	varied	and	innovative	examples	of	selective	



















may	 compete	 for	 the	 business	 of	 an	 insurer,	 rather	 than	 for	 patients.	 Depending	 on	 the	
objectives	 of	 the	 insurer	 and	 the	 contracts	 they	 are	 offered,	 providers	 may	 not	 be	




in	healthcare	 settings,	 and	 the	analogy	with	other	 sectors	may	 fail.	Within	 the	healthcare	
sector,	institutional	details	matter	and	differ	across	services	and	countries.		
The	diversity	 of	 institutional	 details	 and	 concepts	 of	 competition	motivate	 this	 study.	We	
illustrate	how	policies	affecting	competition	have	been	implemented	and	promoted	in	five	
countries:	 France,	Germany,	 the	Netherlands,	Norway	and	Portugal.		We	 restrict	attention	
to	 primary	 (GP)	 and	 secondary	 (hospital)	 services,	 since	 arrangements	 for	 other	 services,	
especially	pharmaceuticals,	raise	novel	but	separate	issues.			
Generally	 policy	 toward	 competition	 in	 healthcare	 markets	 appears	 to	 be	 based	 on	
acceptance	of	the	argument	that	competition	is	potentially	beneficial	in	driving	down	costs	
and	 improving	quality.	 That	 argument	 receives	 some,	 though	not	 complete,	 endorsement	
from	economic	models	of	healthcare	delivery.	In	particular,	most	models	suggest	that	when	
providers	 face	 regulated	 prices	 greater	 competition	 will	 drive	 up	 quality	 (Gaynor	 2006;	
Brekke	 et	 al	 2014).	 There	 is	 a	 general	 move	 towards	 introducing	 policies	 intended	 to	
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increase	 competition	but	 just	 as	 there	 is	 a	diversity	of	what	exactly	 competition	 is	 across	
different	settings,	there	is	also	a	variety	of	policy	responses.		
The	 next	 sections	 outline	 and	 discuss	 the	 results	 from	 the	 case	 studies,	 reflecting	 the	
diversity	 of	 country	 settings	 and	 healthcare	 systems,	 the	 healthcare	 services	 to	 which	
policies	have	been	applied,	the	types	of	policies	and	existing	evidence.	We	are	careful	not	to	
use	 the	 term	 competition	 policy	 because	 this	 is	 often	 synonymous	 with	 controls	 over	
mergers	based	on	antitrust	 law.	 Instead	we	refer	more	broadly	 to	policies	which	enhance	
competition,	for	example	relaxing	constraints	on	patient	choice	of	provider	or	encouraging	





and	 Portugal)	 chosen	 to	 reflect	 differences	 in	 financing	 arrangements	 (social	 insurance	
versus	tax-based	systems),	provider	ownership,	regulatory	frameworks,	gatekeeping	by	GPs,	
and	 patients’	 ability	 to	 choose	 a	 provider.	 The	 case	 studies	were	written	 by	 independent	
academics	following	a	common	template	and	constitute	the	remainder	of	this	Special	Issue	
of	Health	Policy.		
The	 template	 asked	 authors	 to:	 focus	 on	 primary	 and	 secondary	 care;	 identify	 the	
dimensions	 over	 which	 providers	 compete;	 define	 relevant	 markets;	 investigate	 the	
interplay	between	competition	and	patient	choice;	explain	the	role	of	antitrust	authorities;	
review,	 synthesise	 and	 analyse	 evidence,	 including	 academic	 and	 grey	 literature;	 describe	
and	analyse	 the	 role	of	private	providers	and	public-private	partnerships;	 assess	 intended	
and	 unintended	 consequences;	 and	 explore	 how	 competition	 interacts	 with	 initiatives	





Despite	considerable	 international	policy	 interest	 in	 the	role	of	competition	 in	health	care	
(OECD	2012),	the	published	empirical	evidence	is	mixed	and	based	mainly	on	the	US	and	UK	
(OHE	 2012,	 Gaynor	 and	 Town	 2011).	 US	 studies	 are	 also	 often	 difficult	 to	 translate	 to	
publicly-funded	 systems.	There	 is	 very	 limited	evidence	 in	published	 literature	 from	other	
countries.	This	 study	 fills	a	gap	 in	knowledge,	and	overcomes	 language	and	other	barriers	






Some	 countries	 have	 relaxed	 constraints	 on	 patient	 choice	 of	 healthcare	 provider.	 In	
Norway	from	2001	patients	were	given	the	right	to	choose	their	hospital	rather	than	being	
referred	 to	 the	 closest	 hospital.	 Information	 on	 waiting	 time	 for	 selected	 procedures	 is	
provided	 and	 since	 2012	 hospital	 quality	 indicators	 have	 been	 published.	 In	 2015	 patient	
choice	 was	 reinforced	 by	 removing	 constraints	 on	 hospital	 volumes	 and	 allowing	 private	
providers	to	treat	publicly-funded	patients.	Patients	are	now	allowed	to	choose	hospitals	in	
other	regions,	with	the	home	region	paying	the	DRG-price	to	the	receiving	region,	resulting	
in	 increased	 mobility	 across	 regions	 (Ringard	 et	 al	 2006).	 Patient	 choice	 of	 hospital	 is	
responsive	 to	 waiting	 times	 and	 greater	 choice	 may	 have	 contributed	 to	 the	 marked	
reduction	in	waiting	times	(Ringard	and	Hagen	2011).		
Patients	 have	 traditionally	 had	 free	 choice	 of	 hospital	 in	 France.	 Recent	 policies	 have	
facilitated	hospital	 choice	by	providing	public	 information	on	process	measures	of	 quality	
and	hospital	 activity	 (Chone	2016).	 The	website	 http://www.scopesante.fr/	 	 has	 over	 450	
indicators	 including	 generic	 process	 measures,	 such	 as	 hospital-acquired	 conditions	 and	







In	 the	 Netherlands	 the	 government	 has	 introduced	 mandatory	 publication	 of	 hospital	
waiting	 times,	 standardized	 mortality	 ratios	 and	 other	 outcomes	 (Shut	 and	 Varkevisser	
2016).	Evidence	suggests	that	angioplasty	patients	are	more	likely	to	choose	hospitals	with	a	
good	 (overall	 and	 cardiology)	 reputation	 and	 low	 readmissions	 after	 treatment	 for	 heart	
failure	(Varkevisser	et	al	2012).	Patient	choice	of	hospital	for	hip	replacement	is	affected	by	
information	 in	 the	 public	 domain	 on	 reputation	 and	waiting	 times,	 as	well	 as	 travel	 time	
(Beukers	et	al	2014).	
In	Germany	 hospitals	 are	 required	 to	publish	quality	 reports.	However,	 these	 are	 lengthy	
documents	not	easily	accessible	to	patients	and	provide	limited	information	(Kifmann	2016).	





In	 Portugal	 patients	 are	 restricted	 to	 the	 hospital	 in	 whose	 geographically-defined	
catchment	area	they	reside.	For	certain	elective	procedures	patients	can	choose	a	different	
hospital	 if	 they	wait	 longer	than	a	pre-determined	maximum.	There	 is	 limited	 information	
on	 hospital	 performance.	 The	 Health	 Regulatory	 Authority	 provides	 a	 three-star	













Public	 hospitals	 seem	 to	 have	 responded	 to	 competition	 when	 the	 DRG	 payment	 was	
introduced.	Prior	to	its	introduction,	admissions	grew	less	rapidly	in	public	hospitals	than	in	
private	 hospitals	 (Chone	 et	 al	 2013).	 The	 introduction	 of	 DRG	 payment	 in	 2005-2008	
reversed	this	trend.	Public	hospitals	exposed	to	competition	from	private	hospitals	reduced	




Although	 hospital	 prices	 are	 fixed	 by	 the	 DRG	 system,	 self-employed	 physicians	 and	
specialists	 working	 in	 private	 practice	 can	 charge	 extra	 fees	 for	 patient	 consultations	 in	
excess	of	an	administrated	price.	Top-up	fees	have	doubled	between	1990	and	2010.	There	
is	some	evidence	suggesting	that	these	doctors	compete	on	price	(Chone	et	al	2014).	
The	 introduction	 of	 DRG	 payment	 has	 not	 been	without	 critics	who	 have	 suggested	 that	
competition	 will	 reduce	 coordination	 and	 synergies	 amongst	 providers	 leading	 to	missed	
opportunities	to	improve	quality	and	reduce	costs.	A	new	regulation	was	introduced	in	2016	
(Groupement	 Hospitalier	 de	 Territoire)	 to	 foster	 cooperation	 and	 integration	 of	 public	
hospitals.	Each	hospital	has	 to	belong	 to	a	group	associated	with	a	 teaching	hospital,	 and	




(DTC).	 Prices	 are	 fixed	 by	 the	 Dutch	 Healthcare	 Authority	 for	 DTCs	 in	 the	 so-called	 A-
segment,	which	 covers	more	 complex	 care.	 Prices	 are	negotiated	with	health	 insurers	 for	









waive	 the	 annual	 deductible	 if	 patients	 choose	 the	 preferred	 provider	 (Schut	 and	
Varkevisser	 2016).	 Varicose	 vein	 patients	 did	 respond	 to	 such	 financial	 incentives	 but	
cataract	 patients	 did	 not	 (Van	 der	 Geest	 and	 Varkevisser	 2015).	 Overall,	 selective	




There	 is	 limited	evidence	 from	 the	Netherlands	on	 the	effects	of	 hospital	 competition	on	
prices	and	quality.	One	study	suggests	that	hospital	price-cost	margins	were	lower	in	areas	
where	insurers	had	larger	(or	hospitals	had	smaller)	market	shares	(Halbersma	et	al	2011).	A	
study	 of	 cataract	 surgery	 suggests	 that	 negotiated	 prices	 did	 not	 depend	 on	 provider	
concentration	and	were	not	associated	with	quality	(Heijink	et	al	2013).		
The	 DRG	 system	 has	 raised	 concerns	 over	 total	 hospital	 expenditure.	 In	 2011	 the	
government	 introduced	 a	 macro	 budget	 instrument	 to	 guarantee	 that	 annual	 hospital	
expenditure	does	not	exceed	 the	available	budget.	 If	 it	does,	 the	government	can	 require	
hospitals	to	repay	excess	revenues	in	proportion	to	their	market	shares.	This	has	not	been	
used	 because	 of	 national	 agreements	 whereby	 stakeholders	 (insurers,	 government	 and	
providers)	 committed	 to	 an	 annual	 expenditure	 growth	 of	 1%	 for	 2014-2017.	 This	
percentage	 is	 used	 as	 a	 reference	 point	 when	 negotiating	 block	 budgets	 with	 individual	
providers,	which	may	weaken	incentives	for	competition	(Schut	and	Varkevisser	2016).		
In	 Germany	 patients	 have	 historically	 had	 free	 choice.	 Hospitals	 are	 paid	 by	 DRGs	 and	
compete	for	patients.	DRG	tariffs	vary	by	state	and	are	determined	by	state-level	collective	
negotiations	between	 sickness	 funds	and	hospitals.	 Payers	 and	providers	 are	organized	 in	
corporatist	 bodies,	 such	 as	 the	 National	 Association	 of	 Sickness	 Funds	 and	 the	 German	




2016).	 	 Hospitals	 are	 mostly	 restricted	 to	 providing	 care	 for	 inpatients	 and	 surgery	 for	
ambulatory	patients.		
Outpatient	 care	 is	 provided	 by	 specialists	 in	 private	 practices	 and	 payment	 is	 negotiated	
separately	with	 sickness	 funds	 through	 collective	 negotiations	 (Kifmann	 2016).	 Specialists	
are	 represented	 by	 17	 regional	 associations	 who	 receive	 morbidity-adjusted	 capitations	
from	the	sickness	funds	and	which	they	then	distributed	to	their	members.	Physicians	face	
target	budgets	with	 sharp	 reductions	of	payment	 if	 they	are	exceeded	 (Busse	and	Blümel	
2014).	The	boundaries	between	inpatient	and	outpatient	care	have	been	relaxed	since	2004	
and	hospitals	 can	provide	ambulatory	 care	 for	patients	with	 rare	diseases	and	 specialised	
services.	Medical	Treatment	Centres	run	by	hospitals	or	groups	of	self-employed	physicians	




Sickness	 funds	 can	 sign	 selective	 contracts	 with	 providers,	 in	 particular	 ambulatory	 care	
providers.	 Contracts	 can	 complement	 or	 substitute	 services	 agreed	 in	 collective	
negotiations.	 Selective	 contracting	 is	 intended	 to	 stimulate	 quality,	 achieve	 better	
coordination	and	 cooperation	 in	patients’	 care	and	 to	be	evidence-based	 (Kifmann	2016).	
One	example	is	Disease	Management	Programs	for	chronic	diseases	(asthma,	breast	cancer,	
COPD,	 diabetes,	 ischaemic	 heart	 disease)	which	 some	 sickness	 funds	 introduced	 in	 2002.	













(eg	 inpatient	 and	 ambulatory	 care).	 During	 2004-2008	 1%	 of	 funding	 for	 ambulatory	
physicians	 was	 earmarked	 for	 these	 contracts.	 In	 2008-2011	 there	 were	 about	 6,400	
contracts	 and	 coverage	 increased	 from	 1.66	 to	 1.92	 million	 patients.	 Sickness	 funds	
negotiate	 with	 single	 or	 networks	 of	 providers,	 including	 rehabilitative	 care	 providers.	
Payment	can	be	fee-for-service	or	capitation.	Patient	participation	is	voluntary.	Patients	are	
committed	 to	 contracted	 providers	 but	 not	 penalised	 by	 sickness	 funds	 if	 they	 seek	
alternative	providers.	Unlike	Disease	Management	Programs,	Integrated	Care	contracts	can	










In	2002	 the	ownership	of	public	hospitals	was	 transferred	 from	 the	 county	 to	 the	higher-
state	level	and	hospitals	were	given	more	autonomy	and	independence.	Although	hospitals	
are	 state-owned,	 decision-making	 is	 decentralized	 to	 hospitals	 which	 are	 more	 likely	 to	
respond	 to	competition.	However,	 the	2002	ownership	 reform	 involved	mergers	of	public	
hospitals,	which	could	have	weakened	competition.		




Hagen	 2009).	 Average	 waiting	 time	 for	 elective	 care	 was	 250	 days	 in	 1998-2000,	 but	




In	Portugal	 public	 hospitals	 are	 funded	by	 global	 budgets	 calculated	on	predicted	patient	
volumes	 and	pre-determined	DRG	prices	 so	 that	 hospital	 revenue	does	not	 vary	with	 the	
number	 treated.	 Public	 hospitals	 have	 regional	 catchment	 areas	 with	 access	 defined	 by	
citizens’	residence.	Choice	for	highly-specialised	care	may	be	mediated	by	specialists.	Since	
2012	patients	waiting	longer	than	a	predetermined	time	within	a	public	hospital	can	choose	
another	accredited	public	or	private	hospital.	Critically,	 it	 is	 the	original	hospital	 that	pays	
for	 treatment,	 thus	 creating	 strong	 incentives	 to	 keep	 within	 the	 maximum.	 There	 is	
evidence	 suggesting	 that	 the	 policy	 contributed	 to	 reductions	 in	 waiting	 times	 across	 a	







once	 their	 set	 size	 is	 reached.	 The	 GP	 choice	 reform	 was	 accompanied	 by	 a	 change	 in	
payment	so	that	GPs	are	paid	by	capitation	plus	fee-for-service	for	consultations	and	other	
services.	 Capitation	 accounts	 for	 30%	of	GPs	 income	with	 the	 remaining	 70%	 for	 fee-for-
service	payment.	Patients	face	a	copayment.	The	reform	increased	GP	consultations,	patient	
satisfaction	 and	 reduced	waiting	 time	 for	 consultations	 from	 8.3	 to	 7.2	 days	 (Brekke	 and	
Straume	2016).	GPs	operating	in	more	competitive	markets	(proxied	by	available	patient	list	
slots)	have	higher	rates	of	referral	to	secondary	care	(Iversen	and	Ma	2011).		








levels.	 In	 2015	 a	 court	 annulled	 the	 fine	 because	 the	 competition	 authority	 had	 failed	 to	
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insurers.	 Care	 groups	 are	 legal	 entities	 acting	 as	 contractors	 and	 employ	 or	 subcontract	
providers	to	offer	coordinated	outpatient	care.	There	are	about	100	groups,	with	a	median	
of	50	GPs	each,	covering	80%	of	GPs	(van	Dijk	et	al	2014).	A	study	showed	improvements	in	




The	median	market	 share	 is	16%	and	 reaches	40%	 for	a	quarter	of	 groups	 (Van	Dijk	et	 al	
2014).	 Care	 groups	 compete	 for	 GPs	 since	 patients	 do	 not	 actively	 choose	 a	 group.	 One	
study	found	that	one	additional	group	reduced	contract	prices	for	diabetes	by	1.5%	(5	Euro,	
Van	Dijk	et	al	2014).	Regional	insurer	market	concentration	had	no	effect	on	price.	There	are	
large	 price	 variations,	 possibly	 due	 to	 lack	 of	 experience	 in	 negotiating	 contracts	 and	
uncertainty	 about	 care	 covered	 by	 the	 bundle	 (Schut	 and	 Varkevisser	 2016).	 Additional	
payments	are	being	considered	for	patients	with	depression	and	for	frail	elderly.	
In	Germany	 46%	of	doctors	working	 in	private	practices	 in	2012	were	GPs	and	54%	were	
specialists.	 Patients	 can	 generally	 access	 specialists	 without	 seeing	 a	 GP.	 However,	 from	
2007	 sickness	 funds	 need	 to	 sign	Gatekeeping	 Contracts,	 a	 form	 of	 selective	 contracting,	
with	a	partner	representing	more	than	50%	of	GPs	in	an	area,	often	the	German	Association	
of	Family	Physicians,	or	as	an	addition	to	contracts	with	the	regional	physician	association.	

















In	 France	 no	 merger	 case	 has	 concerned	 public	 hospitals.	 There	 have	 been	 90	 mergers	
between	 private	 hospitals	 since	 1995,	 mostly	 small	 or	 medium-size	 hospitals.	 All	 were	
cleared	 by	 the	 competition	 authority	 without	 further	 investigation	 of	 possible	 effects	 on	
quality.	Since	prices	are	regulated,	the	competition	authority	computes	local	market	shares	
to	 assess	 whether	 merging	 hospitals	 could	 reduce	 quality.	 In	 areas	 with	 limited	 private	







In	 the	 first	 phase,	 the	 competition	 authority	 decides	 whether	 a	 license	 is	 needed	 if	 ‘‘a	
dominant	 position	 that	 appreciably	 restricts	 competition…’’	 arises.	 After	 a	 detailed	





have	 argued	 that	 hospital	 merger	 policy	 is	 too	 permissive	 (Loozen	 et	 al	 2014).	 Although	





strong	 competitors	 and	 insurers	would	 have	 been	 left	with	 insufficient	 alternatives	when	
negotiating	with	 providers	 (Varkevisser	 and	 Schut	 2016;	 see	 also	 Schmid	 and	 Varkevisser	
2016).		
In	Germany	 hospital	mergers	 are	 subject	 to	 antitrust	 law	and	 should	be	prohibited	 if	 the	
merged	 firm	 obtains	 more	 than	 40%	 market	 share	 or	 if	 the	 merger	 leads	 to	 significant	
concentration	 (3	 or	 less	 firms	 with	 50%	market	 share,	 or	 5	 or	 less	 firms	 with	 66%).	 The	
competition	 authority	 defines	 the	market	 according	 to	 comparable	 services	 (eg	 acute	 or	
rehabilitative	 care)	 based	 on	 patient	 flows	 and	 travel	 time.	 182	 mergers	 were	 approved	
between	 2004-2014	 and	 7	 were	 prohibited.	 The	 largest	 approved	 merger	 related	 to	 a	




Health	 Regulatory	 Agency	 produces	 an	 opinion	 which	 is	 not	 binding	 on	 the	 competition	
authority.	 Hospital	 mergers	 within	 the	 NHS	 are	 seen	 as	 administrative	 acts.	 Mergers	 of	











The	 involvement	of	private	providers	varies	across	 countries.	There	 is	a	mix	of	public	and	
private	 providers	 in	 Germany,	 France	 and	 Portugal.	 In	 Germany	 in	 2014	 about	 30%	 of	
hospitals	 were	 public,	 35%	 private	 non-profit	 hospitals	 and	 35%	 for-profit	 hospitals	 with	
many	owned	by	chains.	In	France	private	hospitals	provide	60%	of	surgery	and	co-exist	with	
public	 hospitals.	 In	Norway	 most	 hospitals	 are	 public.	 There	 are	 some	 private	 non-profit	
hospitals	providing	care	 for	public	patients	and	also	some	private	 for-profit	hospitals	with	
contracts	for	certain	treatments.	In	Portugal	private	providers	can	provide	services	to	both	
publicly-funded	 and	 privately-funded	 patients.	 Prices	 of	 publicly-funded	 treatments	 are	
negotiated	between	the	NHS	and	private	hospitals,	the	latter	often	organized	in	professional	








Hospitals	 managed	 by	 private	 entities	 under	 PPP	 contracts	 are	 part	 of	 the	 NHS.	 A	 key	
element	was	the	inclusion	of	clinical	services	in	addition	to	infrastructure	which	potentially	
gives	 scope	 to	 innovate,	 reduce	cost	and	 improve	quality.	Each	PPP	 involves	one	contract	
which	 relates	 to	building,	operating	and	maintaining	 the	 infrastructure	and	 lasts	30	years,	










Policies	 aimed	 at	 enhancing	 competition	 in	 the	 health	 sector	 may	 focus	 on	 demand	
(patients)	or	supply	(hospitals	and	GPs)	or	both.	For	example,	patient	choice	policies	aim	at	
removing	restrictions	on	the	set	of	providers	available	to	patients	and	so	encourage	them	to	








Patients’	 choice	 policies	 are	 increasingly	 popular	with	 information	 on	 quality	 increasingly	
available	 in	 the	 public	 domain	 in	 France,	 Norway	 and	 the	 Netherlands.	 There	 is	 some	
evidence	that	demand	responds	to	these	published	quality	indicators	in	the	Netherlands.	In	
Norway	 patients	 are	 likely	 to	 bypass	 local	 hospitals	 following	 the	 introduction	 of	 patient	
choice.	These	findings	are	consistent	with	existing	limited	empirical	literature,	mostly	from	
the	US	and	the	UK	(Brekke	et	al	2014),	which	suggests	that	distance	to	hospital	 is	 the	key	
determinant	 of	 choice.	 Whilst	 hospitals	 with	 higher	 quality	 are	 rewarded	 with	 more	
patients,	the	response	to	higher	quality	–	the	quality	elasticity	of	demand	–	 is	quite	small.	
Patients	with	higher	socioeconomic	status	are	more	likely	to	exert	choice.		




indicators	more	 accessible	 to	 patients	 and	more	 relevant	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 choice.	 Since	




Hospital	 competition	 on	 quality	 for	 publicly-funded	 patients	 is	 present	 in	 all	 countries	
reviewed	except	Portugal	where	patients	are	generally	restricted	to	their	local	hospital.	The	
extent	of	competition	and	the	institutional	set-up	differs	significantly.	Policymakers	have	a	
menu	of	 policy	 options	 in	 relation	 to	 hospital	 competition,	 especially	with	 regard	 to	 how	
prices	 are	 determined.	 For	 example,	 prices	 are	 fixed	 and	 centrally	 determined	 in	 France,	
subject	 to	negotiations	between	 insurers	and	hospitals	 in	 the	Netherlands	and	collectively	
negotiated	between	insurers	and	professional	associations	in	Germany.		
DRG	prices	 are	 normally	 set	 to	 reflect	 past	 average	hospital	 costs.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 case	 in	
Norway	where	 the	 price	 reflects	 only	 40%	 to	 60%	 of	 average	 cost	 and	 is	 determined	 by	
parliament	each	year	 through	the	political	process.	DRG	prices	below	average	costs	might	
help	 in	mitigating	excessive	 incentives	 to	 increase	 volumes,	 a	 common	concern	with	DRG	
systems,	but	also	hinders	quality	competition	since	hospital	profit	margins	 from	attracting	
additional	 patients	 are	 reduced	 or	might	 be	 negative.	 In	 the	 Netherlands,	 concerns	 over	
expenditure	have	 led	 to	 the	 introduction	of	 a	macro	budget	 instrument	which	potentially	
penalises	 all	 hospital	 revenues	 if	 the	 target	 expenditure	 is	 exceeded.	 In	 practice,	 this	 has	
meant	 that	 health	 insurers	 have	 also	 introduced	 expenditure	 caps,	 which	 in	 turn	 also	
reduces	 hospitals’	 incentives	 to	 compete	 on	 quality.	 In	 Germany	 although	 prices	 are	
collectively	negotiated,	there	are	no	restrains	on	hospital	volume	and	hospitals	in	principle	
compete	on	quality.		
There	 is	 generally	 little	 empirical	 evidence	 from	 the	 case	 studies	 whether	 hospital	
competition	increases	quality	under	fixed	price	regulation	or	when	prices	are	negotiated	(as	
in	the	Netherlands).	The	only	exception	is	France	for	which	there	is	evidence	that	public	and	
private	 hospitals	 treating	 publicly-funded	 patients	 do	 compete	 for	 patients	 on	 non-price	
attributes.	 Although	 there	 seems	 to	 be	 general	 support	 for	 policies	 stimulating	 hospital	
quality	competition,	some	concerns	have	also	been	raised.	In	France	in	particular	it	has	been	
suggested	 that	 competition	 may	 hinder	 collaboration.	 There	 have	 been	 consequent	
attempts	to	combine	competition	and	cooperation	across	hospitals	with	teaching	hospitals	
leading	and	coordinating	groups	of	public	hospitals.			
Choice	 and	 competition	 policies	 for	 GPs	 have	 mixed	 support	 across	 countries.	 Norway	
introduced	GP	choice	 in	2001	and	combined	 it	with	an	element	of	 fee-for-service	 to	align	
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patients	 and	 doctors	 incentives.	 There	 is	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 the	 policy	 led	 to	 GPs	
being	more	 responsive	 to	 patients.	 In	 contrast,	 attempts	 by	 the	 competition	 authority	 to	
remove	 restrictions	 on	 GP	 entry	 and	 competition	 in	 the	 Netherlands	 have	 been	 strongly	
resisted	by	GPs	and	have	been	controversial.	The	example	highlights	the	importance	of	the	
political	process	when	introducing	such	policies.		




developed.	 There	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 patients	 registered	 with	 gatekeeping	 GPs	
experienced	fewer	hospital	admissions	but,	somewhat	surprisingly,	visited	specialists	more	
frequently.		





providers.	 There	 are	 unresolved	 design	 questions.	Horizontal	 competition	 can	 hinder	 vertical	
integration	 by	 increasing	 the	 segmentation	 of	 care	 pathways,	 but	 policymakers	 can	 introduce	
vertical	competition	between	integrated	care	pathway	providers.		
Hospital	mergers	 are	 increasingly	 subject	 to	 scrutiny	by	 competition	 authorities.	 Even	 for	
countries	where	hospital	DRG	tariffs	are	fixed	and	hospitals	cannot	collude	on	price,	there	
are	 concerns	 that	quality	may	 suffer	 following	a	merger.	 In	 France,	Norway	and	Portugal,	
mergers	 between	 public	 hospitals	 are	 treated	 as	 administrative	 acts	 and	 internal	
reorganisations	 of	 public	 services,	 and	 not	 subject	 to	 authorisation	 from	 the	 competition	
authority.	 This	 is	not	 the	 case	 for	private	hospitals,	 though	 the	 vast	majority	of	proposed	
mergers	have	been	approved	on	the	ground	that	markets	would	still	exhibit	sufficient	choice	
and	 competition	 from	 the	 remaining	 rivals.	 Occasionally,	 mergers	 have	 been	 stopped	 if	




mergers	 in	 the	 foreseeable	 future.	 The	 rationale	 for	 exempting	 public	 hospitals	 from	 the	




effect	 of	 ownership	 on	 quality	 is	 mixed	 (Herrera	 et	 al	 2014).	 In	 France,	 Germany	 and	





(eg	 the	provision	of	 an	 emergency	department	 in	 public	 hospitals),	 regulatory	 constraints	
(VAT,	pension	contributions,	access	 to	capital)	and	abilities	 to	 treat	 less	complex	cases.	 In	
Portugal	private	hospitals	have	been	built	under	Public	Private	Partnerships	to	the	benefit	of	
publicly-funded	patients.	Private	providers	can	be	an	integral	part	of	publicly-funded	health	




This	 study	 shows	 how	 policies	 aimed	 at	 stimulating	 competition	 are	 multifaceted.	 It	
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